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LINDSAY F. WILEY ∗
HEALTHY PLANET, HEALTHY PEOPLE: INTEGRATING GLOBAL HEALTH INTO THE
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Abstract
The potentially groundbreaking negotiations currently underway on the international response to
climate change and national implementation of commitments under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) include a number of hotly contested issues: (1) what
degree of climate change is acceptable as a basis for emissions targets, (2) to what extent and in what
ways climate change mitigation should incorporate emissions reductions or increased sinks for
developing countries, (3) whether the legal regime governing mitigation can take advantage of the
huge mitigation potential of changed practices in the land use and agricultural sectors, (4) how
adaptation should be financed and at what level, and (5) what should be the priorities for adaptation
funding. Health concerns should play a crucial role in resolving all of these questions, but it is by no
means certain that they will. In addition to providing a more compelling justification for climate
change mitigation and a means for evaluating what degree of climate change is acceptable, health
concerns might shape the contours of an emissions trading mechanism by weighing in favor of
including mitigation actions in developing countries as well as land use and agricultural sources of
emissions and sinks. Such efforts represent low-cost reduction opportunities and have direct cobenefits for health. In addition to arguing for a secure financing mechanism with potential to
generate massive funding for adaptation as a global health promotion priority, health policymakers
should play a role in determining priorities for the use of adaptation funds. Emphasis on climate
change as a fundamental transformation of our environment that will have important consequences
for human health has the potential to motivate the additional political will needed to improve our
global health infrastructure in ways that will better position us to provide routine services as
everyday needs for those services intensify. Many potential climate change adaptation projects, such
as the development of better disease surveillance and response capacity, improvements in sanitation,
protection of food and water security, and the strengthening of natural disaster preparedness and
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response capabilities, look a lot like traditional international health initiatives. Because international
cooperation for climate change adaptation is driven by the transboundary causes of climate change
rather than the transboundary nature of the health threats at issue, the adaptation regime has the
potential to prioritize some previously neglected health concerns that contribute significantly to the
global burden of disease, even where those concerns do not pose a threat to the industrialized world.
Given the importance of health impacts in advocating for and developing the mechanisms that will
govern climate change mitigation and adaptation, as well as the risk of diversion of funds away from
global health initiatives toward climate change initiatives in a time when financial resources are being
stretched thin due to a global economic crisis, global health policymakers must fight for their
rightful place at the table in climate change negotiations and governance at the national and
international level.
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I
INTRODUCTION
Climate change has been called the “defining human development challenge of the 21st
century.” 1 On the one hand, there is ever-increasing scientific certainty that anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHG) and destruction of sinks has sped up, or “forced,” climate
change 2 at such a rate that our technology, our institutional capacity, and our political will may not
be sufficient to respond to the challenges it will raise. 3 On the other hand, the process will take
place over the course of several decades, and there is still considerable uncertainty about what the
exact impacts of climate change will be and how quickly they will occur, particularly at the local
level. 4 Policymakers at every level of government are currently grappling with the prospect of
massive changes to our way of life that will be required both to mitigate climate change – through
reduction of emissions and increase of sinks so that its potential extent will be more limited – and to
adapt to climate change through changes to human systems. Such changes must ensure that we are
better prepared to respond to the impacts of climate change that have, at this point, become either
largely inevitable or are already being experienced.
At the annual Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Copenhagen in December 2009, 5 member states took action to
address the fate of two of the UNFCCC’s key projects. The first was agreement upon a successor to
the largely unsuccessful and soon-to-expire Kyoto Protocol, 6 which has been the basis of the
primary climate change mitigation regime at the international level. The second was the negotiation
of increased financing for a new monetary fund for adaptation to the impacts of climate change in
the developing world, which has the potential to dramatically increase resilience to the threats posed
by climate change. 7 The ongoing negotiations on the implementation of a post-2012 framework at
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), home page for the Human Development Report 2007/2008:
Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/.
2 See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007 – The Physical Science
Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg1.htm.
3 See generally IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm.
4 Id.
5 See UNFCCC home page, Countdown to Copenhagen, at http://unfccc.int/2860.php (last visited March 20, 2009).
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998).
7 See generally UNFCCC, Adaptation Fund, at
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/3659.php (last visited March
20, 2009).
1
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the international and national level include a number of hotly contested issues: (1) what degree of
climate change is acceptable as a basis for emissions targets, (2) to what extent and in what ways the
mitigation regime should incorporate mitigation approaches in developing countries, (3) whether the
mitigation regime can take advantage of the huge mitigation potential of changed practices in the
land use and agricultural sectors, (4) how adaptation should be financed and at what level, and (5)
what should be the priorities for adaptation funding.
Health concerns should play a crucial role in the resolution of all of these issues, but it is by
no means certain that they will. Current and future health impacts of climate change have garnered
some attention in recent years, but global environmental governance remains grounded in a tradition
of natural resources conservation that has not always been receptive to what it casts as an
anthropocentric view of environmental issues. Although health impacts have played a role as an
important motivation for environmental regulation, 8 environmental governance structures at the
national and international level have largely failed to include health advocates and policymakers in a
coordinated response to environmental health threats. 9 At the same time, global health governance
has referred to environmental concerns mostly in passing, noting the role of climate change, for
example, as one among many transboundary concerns with implications for global health, 10 but
rarely delving into the potential of environmental policy as a significant opportunity to better meet
the basic survival needs of the world’s least healthy people.

8 See, e.g., Kira Matus, et al., Toward Integrated Assessment of Environmental Change: Air Pollution Health Effects in
the USA, 88 Climate Change 59 (2008).
9 William Onzivu, International Environmental Law, the Public’s Health, and Domestic Environmental Governance in
Developing Countries, 21 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 597 (2006).
Cf. UNFCCC, Cooperation with International Organizations, at
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/cooperation_with_international_organizations/items/2533.php (last
visited March 20, 2009) (The UNFCCC website emphasizes that the UNFCCC has been part of significant efforts to
enhance coordination among the three Rio Conventions – the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the UNFCCC – all of which are environmental treaties. It also
indicates its appreciation of statements by other international organizations – the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), World Bank, the UNDP, the UNCCD, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and
the IPCC – on their efforts to address climate change. The World Health Organization (WHO) is not mentioned,
although its governing body, the World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted a resolution last year addressing the human
health impacts of climate change and indicating that the WHO should advise member states regarding those impacts and
work together with the UNFCCC to address them. See WHA61.19 (May 24, 2008).
10 See, e.g., Robert M. Pestronk, et. al, Improving Laws and Legal Authorities for Public Health Emergency Legal
Preparedness, 36 J. L. Med. & Ethics 47, 47 (2008); Thomas E. Novotny, Global Governance and Public Health
Security in the 21st Century, 38 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 19, 29, 34(2007); Sen. William H. Frist, Medicine as a Currency for
Peace Through Global Health Diplomacy, 26 Yale L. and Pol’y Rev. 209, 228 (2007).
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The effects of climate change will be experienced in every region, but will disproportionately
affect the world’s poorest people. 11 In addition to creating novel threats to health and shifting the
geographic scope of existing threats, climate change will also act as an intensifier, dramatically
increasing the magnitude of preexisting problems ranging from poverty, conflict, and hunger to
infectious and chronic disease burdens. 12 In poor countries and in poor communities within wealthy
countries, the effects will be monumentally more devastating. The world’s poorest and least healthy
people also have the least capacity to ameliorate the potentially devastating effects of climate
change. 13 Climate change, therefore, not only challenges the international community to find
solutions to reduce the health effects, but also to address the inevitable questions of environmental
justice.
In recent years, health advocates have begun to raise the profile of health consequences as a
major impact of climate change through promotions such as World Health Organization’s (WHO)
World Health Day 14 and the American Public Health Association’s (APHA) Public Health Week, 15
both of which focused on climate change in 2008. Climate change is expected to act primarily as an
intensifier and to some extent a redistributor of existing threats to health. 16 Direct effects include
excess mortality and morbidity due to exacerbated air pollution, heat waves, hurricanes, floods,
wildfires, and other natural disasters. Devastating natural disasters have indirect effects on health as
well, through increased infectious disease risk and toxic exposures through contaminated
floodwaters or unsanitary shelter conditions. Climate change also creates fertile conditions for, and
alters the geographic range of, infectious disease vectors such as insects and rodents — for example,
bringing malaria to higher altitudes and dengue fever further north. Increases in food-borne illness,
which thrives in warmer conditions, are also anticipated. Worldwide, scarcity of clean, safe water for
drinking and sanitation is perhaps the most concerning anticipated impact of climate change. Water
scarcity can be devastating to human health, especially through its impact on diarrheal illnesses,
which are among the greatest killers of children in the developing world. Ecosystem changes and
See generally, IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Chapter 8: Human Health, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter8.pdf.
12 See generally, IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm.
13 Id.
14 See WHO, World Health Day 2008: Protecting Health from Climate Change, at http://www.who.int/world-healthday/previous/2008/en/index.html.
15 See APHA, Climate Change: Our Health in Balance, National Public Health Week: April 7-13, 2008, at
http://www.nphw.org/nphw08/default.htm.
16See section II, infra, for discussion of health impacts in greater detail.
11
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water scarcity will in turn impair crop, livestock, and fisheries’ yields, exacerbating what is already a
growing food crisis. More remote, but even more devastating impacts may come in the form of
economic instability, migration, and armed conflict in a time of competition for increasingly scarce
resources.
Preventative health strategies focusing on the environment range from household measures
such as safe water storage and food handling practices to energy, transportation, manufacturing,
agriculture, land use, and urban planning policies – all areas that are relevant to the ongoing debates
surrounding climate mitigation and adaptation approaches. 17 A key lesson of environmental health
is that environmental policy interventions can have significant co-benefits for health. 18 There can
also be significant gains for social and economic wellbeing, despite the fact that environmental
health is often pitted against economic development considerations in policy debates. 19 Climate
policy adds a new layer to the complex relationships between the environment, health, and
development. Thus far, however, international, national, and even local approaches to climate
change have been largely driven by an environmental policy community that has its foundation in
natural resources conservation. Unless health policymakers and advocates play a more integral role
in the negotiation and implementation of environmental and climate policy, they may miss
important opportunities to reduce the global disease burden through policy interventions that have
the greatest potential for co-benefits for health. The potential for action on both mitigation and
adaptation following the Copenhagen Conference of Parties in December 2009 makes this a critical
time for health advocacy. As political momentum in support of strong climate change policy builds,
health advocates must act to ensure that mitigation mechanisms take potential co-benefits for health
fully into account, and that support for global health infrastructure will be a key part of our
international adaptation response.
This paper argues that emphasis on climate change as a fundamental transformation of our
environment that will have important consequences for human health has the potential to motivate
and shape consensus on mitigation of climate change while also improving our global health
See generally IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Mitigation of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group III
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, available at See generally IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
IPCC, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm.
18 See generally WHO, Preventing Disease through Healthy Environments: Towards and Estimate of the
Environmental Burden of Disease (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/quantifying_ehimpacts/publications/preventingdisease.pdf; Matus, supra note X.
19 See generally UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in
a Divided World, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf.
17
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infrastructure as an adaptation to climate change impacts. Part II focuses on the global health
burden currently attributable to environmental causes and on the anticipated health impacts of
climate change. Part III provides background on international climate governance under the
UNFCCC and on the current status of negotiations. Part IV sets forth an agenda for the integration
of global health concerns into the negotiation of a series of key issues currently under debate in the
international response to climate change and the national implementation of international
obligations. Part V offers a conclusion emphasizing the importance of involving global health
policymakers in the response to climate change.
II
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
In many ways, environmental health has not received policymakers’ attention in proportion
to its importance as a source of global disease burden. The WHO estimates that nearly one-quarter
of the global disease burden, and more than one-third of the disease burden among children under
age fourteen, is attributable to modifiable environmental factors such as unsafe drinking water and
sanitation and air pollution (both indoor and outdoor). 20 The impact of the environment is seen
especially in diarrheal illness, lower respiratory infections, unintentional injuries, and malaria.
Approximately 94% of diarrheal illness worldwide is attributable to modifiable environmental
factors, mostly inadequate access to safe drinking water and unsafe sanitation and hygiene
practices. 21 Approximately 42% of malaria is attributable to modifiable environmental factors such
as land use policy and practices, deforestation, water management, settlement siting, and house
design. 22 In turn, diarrheal illness, lower respiratory infections, and malaria are among the biggest
contributors to the global burden of disease. 23 The burden of unhealthy environments is shouldered
disproportionately by children, particularly in the developing world. WHO estimates that more than
four million child deaths each year are attributable to environmental causes, mostly in the developing
world, and that the infant death rate from environmental causes is twelve times higher in developing
countries than in developed countries. 24 If, as Larry Gostin has suggested, one of the goals of global
health law and policy should be meeting the basic survival needs of the world’s least healthy

See WHO, Preventing Disease, supra note X, at 9 (measuring disease burden in terms of Disability Adjusted LifeYears (DALYs)).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 10.
23 Id. at 11.
24 Id.
20
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people, 25 then environmental health is an excellent starting point. Climate change acts largely as an
intensifier and to some extent a redistributor of existing threats to health, acting through the same
pathways by which environmental factors are already contributing to global disease burden. 26
Perhaps the most high profile health impact of climate change is an increase in the extremity
and frequency – as well as a geographical shift – of extreme weather events. Heat waves are the
health threat that is most intuitively connected to climate change, and discussion of the climatehealth nexus often focuses on recent heat waves in Europe and North America, which have caused
excess mortality measured in tens of thousands of lives. 27 Sea level rise has the potential to
dramatically increase storm surge, 28 which in turn plays an important role in determining how
destructive a particular storm will be. The geographic distribution of hurricanes and tropical storms
will also change, bringing greater frequency of severe storms to some areas. 29 An increase in the
frequency and severity of floods, which are the most common severe weather event, is also likely as
rising average temperatures intensify evaporation and precipitation in some areas. 30 Out of control
wildfires, which are not classified as weather events but are strongly affected by weather conditions,
are also likely to become more frequent and more severe in some areas. 31 In addition to causing
direct injuries, extreme weather events also have less obvious effects on health. Researchers have

Lawrence O. Gostin, Meeting the Basic Survival Needs of the World’s Least Healthy People: Toward a Framework
Convention on Global Health, 96 Geo. L.J. 317.
26 See generally Anthony Costello, et al., Managing the Health Effects of Climate Change, 373 The Lancet 1693 (2009)
27 See, e.g., WHO, Climate and Health Fact Sheet (July 2005), at
http://www.who.int/globalchange/news/fsclimandhealth/en/index.html.
28 See, e.g., J.H. Pardue et al., Chemical and Microbiological Parameters in New Orleans Floodwater Following
Hurricane Katrina, Envtl. 39 Sci. & Tech. 8591 (2005); Euripides Euripidou & Virginia Murray, Public Health Impacts
of Floods and Chemical Contamination, 26 J. Pub. Health 376 (2004); Burkhard Stachel et al., The Elbe Flood in
August 2002: Organic Contaminants in Sediment Samples Taken After the Flood Event, 40 J. Envtl. Sci. & Health 265
(2005); Carlos del Ninno & Matthias Lundberg, Treading water. The Long-term Impact of the 1998 Flood on Nutrition
in Bangladesh, 3 Econ. & Human Biology 67 (2005).
29 See, e.g., Mike Ahern et al., Global Health Impacts of Floods: Epidemiologic Evidence, Epidemiological Rev., 36
(2005); R.C. Balling & R.S. Cervany, Compilation and Discussion of Trends in Severe Storms in the United States:
Popular Perception v. Climate Reality, 29 Nat. Hazards 103 (2003); Kerry Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of
Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30 Years, 436 Nature 686 (2005); P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone
Number, Duration, and Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 Science 1844 (2005).
30 See, e.g., A. Bronstert, Floods and Climate Change: Interactions and Impacts, 23 Risk Analysis 545 (2003); K.E.
Kunkel, North American Trends in Extreme Precipitation, 29 Natural Hazards 291(2003); C.A. Senior, et al., Predictions
of Extreme Precipitation and Sea-level Rise Under Climate Change, 360A Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London 1301 (2002).
31 See, e.g., T.J. Brown, B.L. Hall, and A.L. Westerling, The Impact of Twenty-first Century Climate Change on Wildland
Fire Danger in the Western United States: An Applications Perspective, 62 Climatic Change 365 (2004); J.S. Fried, M.
S. Torn, and E. Mills, The Impact of Climate Change on Wildfire Severity: A Regional Forecast for Northern California,
64 Climatic Change 169 (2004).
25
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pointed to the mental health effects of disasters as a hidden burden on health. 32 We might also see
increased exposure to infectious pathogens or toxic chemicals through contaminated floodwaters or
unsanitary living conditions following an event. 33 Natural disasters can also cause a dangerous
disruption in health care for those suffering from chronic diseases like HIV/AIDS, diabetes, or
cardiovascular disease, for which regular medication and treatment is necessary.
However, perhaps even more insidious than the more high-profile events that garnered
some public awareness as being affected by climactic conditions, are the more gradually emerging,
but equally concerning effects on health anticipated as an impact of climate change. For example,
exacerbated air pollution will have an impact on cardiovascular and respiratory health. 34 Rising
temperatures result in higher levels of ground-level ozone pollution (better known as “smog”),
which is formed by chemical reactions between certain air pollutants (mainly nitrogen oxides and
volatile organic compounds 35) and sunlight. 36 While ozone is beneficial in the upper atmosphere
where it provides protection from UV rays, it becomes a harmful pollutant when it forms at ground
level. Exposure to ground-level ozone pollution can cause short-term, reversible diminished lung
function as well as more persistent inflammation of lung tissue. 37 People who live in areas with high
ozone concentrations are more likely to suffer from asthma 38 and have a higher risk of premature

32 See, e.g., K.L. Middleton, J. Willner and K. M. Simmons, Natural Disasters and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Symptom Complex: Evidence from the Oklahoma Tornado Outbreak, 9 International Journal of Stress
Management 229 (2002); C.V. Russoniello, et al., Childhood Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Efforts to Cope After
Hurricane Floyd, 28 Behavioral Medicine 61 (2002); P. Verger, et al., Assessment of Exposure to a Flood Disaster in a
Mental-health Study, 13 Journal of Exposure Analysis and Environmental Epidemiology 436 (2003); C.S. North, et
al., The Course of PTSD, Major Depression, Substance Abuse, and Somatization After a Natural Disaster, 192 The
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 823 (2005); J.G.I. Barbee, and M.H. Townsend, Mental Health and Recovery
in the Gulf Coast After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 296 JAMA 585 (2006).
33 See, e.g., U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morbidity Surveillance After Hurricane Katrina –
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, 55 MMWR – Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report 727 (September
2005).
34 See IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Chapter 8: Human Health, 409-12, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter8.pdf.
35 Volatile organic compounds (VOC), including carbon dioxide and methane, are emitted through the burning of fossil
fuels and evaporation from stored fuels, solvents, and other chemicals, as well as evaporation from vegetation. See, e.g.,
U.S. Geological Survey, Volatile Organic Compounds, at http://toxics.usgs.gov/definitions/vocs.html (last visited
March 20, 2009).
36 See, e.g., Susan M. Bernard, The Potential Impacts of Climate Variability and Change on Air Pollution-Related Health
Effects in the United States, 109 Envtl. Health Persp. 199 (2001).
37 See, e.g., L.J. Folinsbee, W.F. McDonnell and D.H. Horstman, Pulmonary Function and Symptom Responses After
6.6-hour Exposure to 0.12 ppm Ozone with Moderate Exercise 38 Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association
38 (1988); R.B. Devlin, et al., Exposure of Humans to Ambient Levels of Ozone for 6.6 Hours Causes Cellular and
Biochemical Changes in the Lung, 4 American Journal of Respiratory Cell and Molecular Biology 72 (1991).
38 See, e.g., J.J. Kim, American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Environmental Health: Ambient Air Pollution:
Health Hazards to Children, 114 Pediatrics 1699 (2004); J. Schwartz, Short Term Fluctuations in Air Pollution and
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death. 39 Particulate matter (PM2.5), which includes all airborne particles that are less than 2.5
micrometers in diameter, can be either emitted directly from sources of pollution or formed through
atmospheric reactions (which are influenced by rising temperatures) among various pollutant gasses.
PM2.5 exposure has been associated with respiratory and cardiovascular effects, ranging from
coughing and difficulty breathing, diminished lung function, and exacerbation of asthma to the
development of chronic bronchitis and increased incidence of heart attack and arrhythmias. 40
Researchers also anticipate an increased incidence of zoonotic, vector-, food-, and waterborne diseases as changing environmental conditions affect the survival, persistence, habitat range,
and transmission of a variety of pathogens. 41 Vector-borne infectious diseases, such as malaria,
dengue fever, West Nile Virus, and Lyme Disease are those that are spread by blood-feeding
arthropods such as mosquitoes and ticks that carry pathogens from human to human. Zoonotic
diseases, such as Hantavirus carried by rodents or H5N1 influenza carried by birds, develop in an
animal population reservoir and are spread to humans that come into contact with infected animals.
Both types of illness are affected by the shifting weather patterns that come with climate change as
the habitats and size of animal populations shift in ways that may bring them into greater contact
with humans. 42 The impact of climate change on malaria and dengue fever, the vector-borne
illnesses with the greatest disease burden, are particularly concerning. Increased rainfall and
temperatures have a significant impact on increasing the length of transmission season and altering
Hospital Admissions of the Elderly for Respiratory Disease, 50 Thorax 531 (1995); R. McConnell, et al., Asthma in
Exercising Children Exposed to Ozone: A Cohort Study, 359 Lancet 386 (2002).
39 See, e.g., M. Bell and H. Ellis, Sensitivity Analysis of Tropospheric Ozone to Modified Biogenic Emissions for the
Mid-Atlantic Region, 38 Atmospheric Environment 1879 (2004).
40 See, e.g., D.W. Dockery, et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 N. Engl. J.
Med. 1753 (1993); J.M. Samet, et al., Fine Particulate Air Pollution and Mortality in 20 U.S. Cities, 1987–1994, 343 N.
Engl. J. Med. 1742 (2000); C. A. Pope III, et al., Particulate Air Pollution as a Predictor of Mortality in a Prospective
Study of U.S. Adults, 151 American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 669 (1995); C.A. Pope, D.W.
Dockery, Health Effects of Fine Particulate Air Pollution: Lines that Connect, 54 Journal of Air and Waste
Management Association 709 (2006); F. Dominici, et al., Fine Particulate Air Pollution and Hospital Admission for
Cardiovascular and Respiratory Diseases, 295 JAMA 1127 (2006); F. Laden, et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air
Pollution and Mortality: Extended, 173 American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 667 (2006).
41 See, e.g., IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Chapter 8: Human Health, 408, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter8.pdf; Kathryn Senior, Climate Change and
Infectious Disease: A Dangerous Liason? 8 Lancet Infectious Diseases 92 (2008).
42 See, e.g., D.J. Rogers & S.E. Randolph, Climate Change and Vector-Borne Diseases, 62 Advances Parasitology 345
(2006); P. Gale, et al., Predicting the Impact of Climate Change on Livestock Diseases in Great Britain, 162 The
Veterinary Record 214 (2008); John S. Brownstein et al., A Climate-Based Model Predicts the Spatial Distribution of
the Lyme Disease Vector Ixodes scapularis in the United States, 111 Envtl. Health Persp. 1152 (2003); R.S. Kovats et
al., Early Effects of Climate Change: Do They Include Changes in Vector-Borne Disease?, 356 Phil. Transactions
Royal Soc’y 1057 (2001); Simon Hales et al., El Niño and the Dynamics of Vectorborne Disease Transmission, 107
Envtl. Health Persp. 99 (1999).
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the geographic distribution of vector mosquitoes, both in terms of latitudinal and altitudinal
distribution. 43 Climate change is expected to bring major changes in the risk of malaria in areas that
are at the edges of current geographical distribution. 44 Food-borne illness is also sensitive to climate
change as higher ambient temperatures allow food-borne pathogens to thrive. 45 Salmonellosis has
been shown to be particularly sensitive to increased temperatures. 46 Campylobacteriosis, on the
other hand, is less sensitive to changes in temperatures, but is affected by climate change through its
impact on water scarcity, as discussed below. 47 Higher ocean surface water temperatures also have
an impact on food poisoning through the effect of harmful algael blooms 48 and methylation of
mercury 49 on shellfish and reef fish contamination.
Scarcity of clean, safe water for drinking and sanitation is perhaps the most concerning
anticipated impact of climate change. Water scarcity can be devastating to human health, 50 especially
through its impact on diarrheal illnesses, which are among the greatest killers of children in the
developing world. 51 Incidence of water-borne diseases, such as cholera, cryptosporidiosis, and
campylobacteriosis, is expected to rise as a result of climate change – as an effect of both droughts,
which concentrate pathogens in pools, and floods, which increase runoff and microbial
contamination of water supplies. 52 Water-washed diseases – illnesses for which the main
transmission pathway is not through contaminated water, but which are affected by hygiene
practices and thus sensitive to water scarcity, such as rotavirus – are also expected to be significantly
affected by climate change. 53
Over a longer time horizon, we may see even more serious threats to health due to major
changes in human settlements and increasing armed conflict as a result of climate change and sea

See ICCP, supra note X, at 407.
Id.
45 See, e.g., R.Sari Kovats, et al., The Effect of Temperature on Food Poisoning: A Time-series Analysis of Salmonellosis
in Ten European Countries, 132 Epidemiology and Infection 443 (2004).
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., R. Sari Kovats et al., Climate Variability and Campylobacter Infection: An International Study, 49 Int’l. J.
Biometeorology 207.
48 IPCC, supra note X, at 400.
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Corrine J. Schuster-Wallace, et al., Safe Water as the Key to Global Health (United Nations University
International Network on Water, Environment, and Health) (2008), available at
http://www.inweh.unu.edu/inweh/Health/2008PolicyBrief.pdf; Bettina Menne & Roberto Bertollini, The Health
Impacts of Desertification and Drought, in Down to Earth, (2000), 4.
51 See WHO, Preventing Disease, supra note X, at 9 (measuring disease burden in terms of Disability Adjusted LifeYears (DALYs)).
52 ICCP, Chapter 8: Human Health, supra note X, at 401.
53 Id.
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level rise. 54 We could see widespread food and water insecurity on an unprecedented scale as the
global food and water crises that are already occurring as a result of population growth,
environmental degradation, and economic factors 55 are exacerbated by climate change. The
mutually reinforcing trends of climate change and environmental degradation are “likely to make
many parts of the world uninhabitable, or at least uneconomic,” potentially resulting in mass
migration both within and across national borders. 56
III
THE UNFCCC AND THE 2009 CONFERENCE OF PARTIES
A. International Cooperation for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation
In 1992, most nations of the world, including the United States, signed the UNFCCC, which
went into effect in1994. 57 As a framework convention, the UNFCCC did not itself create significant
legally binding obligations. Rather, it set forth the broad goal of stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse
gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
global climate system within a time frame that would allow for natural adaptation of ecosystems to
climate change, protection of food production, and sustainable economic development. 58 The
UNFCCC’s climate change mitigation policy is directed primarily at industrialized countries, and its
original goal was to stabilize those countries’ greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by the year
2000. As of 2009, 192 countries had ratified the UNFCCC.
In 1997, following particularly tense negotiations at the Kyoto Conference of Parties to the
UNFCCC, the parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which went into force in 2005. 59 In the
agreement that was eventually hashed out despite considerable discord between the U.S. and E.U.
delegations, thirty-eight developed countries, listed in Annex 1, agreed to reduce their emissions of
six key greenhouse gases to at least 5% below 1990 levels by 2012. 60 Developing countries were not

See, e.g., Lester R. Brown, Plan B 3.0 (2007).
See Center for Strategic and International Studies, A Call for a Strategic U.S. Approach to the Global Food Crisis:
A Report of the CSIS Task Force on the Global Food Crisis, Core Findings and Recommendations (July 2008),
available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080728_food_security.pdf; Running Dry: The Humanitarian Impact
of the Global Water Crisis, IRIN In Depth (2006), available at http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/in-depth/Running-DryIRIN-In-Depth.pdf.
56 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Climate Change Refugees, Scientific American (May 2007), available at
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=climate-change-refugees.
57 See UNFCCC, Essential Background, at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/2877.php.
58 UNFCCC, art. 2.
59 See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
60 Id.
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committed to binding targets, though they had the option of establishing voluntary targets. 61 In
addition to emission reduction targets, the agreement established a system of emissions trading, joint
implementations, and clean development mechanisms to encourage cooperation between developed
and developing countries to reduce emissions. Although the United States signed the Protocol, it is
the only major developed country that has not ratified it. In 1997, the U.S. Senate passed a
unanimous resolution stating that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol that
did not include binding emission reduction targets for developing as well as developed countries. 62
The Clinton administration never sent the protocol to the Senate for ratification and the Bush
administration openly opposed ratification, arguing that China and India were not bound to
emissions reduction targets and that participation in such a regime would unjustifiably disadvantage
the U.S. economy against these emerging competitors. 63
B. Negotiation of a Successor to the Kyoto Protocol
Because the United States refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and because those countries
that did ratify have virtually all fallen far short of meeting their obligations under it, 64 the Kyoto
Protocol has been widely regarded as a failure. In any case, the commitments contained in the
Kyoto Protocol expire in 2012 and, starting in 2004, the UNFCCC member states began to sketch
out what a successor GHG emissions-reduction regime might look like, and to establish milestones
to stay on track for negotiation of a successor protocol. At the 2007 Conference of Parties in Bali,
the United States joined other nations in agreeing to negotiate a successor protocol by the end of
2009 as part of the Bali Action Plan. 65 Although a change in the U.S. presidential administration
may make U.S. participation in the Kyoto successor regime possible, any agreement would still have
to be ratified by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate, and ratification by such a majority is unlikely unless
emerging economies that are important economic competitors for the United States are bound to
emission reduction targets. Draft agreements were presented by the chair and discussed by the

Id.
See The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, available at http://www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html.
63 See, e.g., Tony Karon, When it Comes to Kyoto, the U.S. is the “Rogue Nation,” Time (July 24, 2001), available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,168701,00.html; BBC News, Bush Faces Up to Kyoto Critics (June
11, 2001) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1382564.stm.
64 See ISN Current Affairs, Call for Agreement to Replace Kyoto (September 1, 2009), available at
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=105368.
65 UNFCCC, The Bali Action Plan, at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf.
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parties during negotiation sessions in Bonn, Germany in June and August of 2009. 66 Ultimately,
however, much of the substance of the new mitigation regime was left unsettled leading up to the
December 2009 Conference of Parties in Copenhagen. 67 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) had recommended that in the Copenhagen agreement, industrialized countries must
commit to reducing their emissions by 25%-40% compared to 1990 levels by 2020 to remain close
to a 2˚C rise in average temperatures. Early on, it became apparent that such a commitment was
unlikely. At the 2008 Conference of Parties in Poznan, the European Union, Norway, and
Switzerland were among the only parties who expressed some willingness to seriously negotiate on
this point. 68
C. The Adaptation Regime
Whereas mitigation efforts seek to avoid harmful anthropogenic climate change, or at least
reduce its extent, adaptation efforts seek to reduce the vulnerability of human settlements to the
impacts of climate change. Adaptation measures seek to build “ecological and social community
resilience to climate change.” 69 Ecological resiliency includes “protecting and preserving the natural
ecosystems that help human communities survive through buffering from floods, filtering drinking
water, stabilizing soil, providing sustainable forest products, and preserving a host of other
ecosystem services necessary for human survival.” 70 In the context of climate governance under the
UNFCCC, ecological resiliency is not pursued for the purpose of “preserving functioning
ecosystems and their myriad component species for their own sake,” 71 though that is a purpose of
other international environmental agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity. 72
Social resiliency includes “forging the democratic capacity to help marginalized communities accrue
the administrative, technical, and political power that will help them make difficult decisions and
See UNFCCC, Bonn Climate Change Talks – June 2009, at http://unfccc.int/meetings/sb30/items/4842.php;
UNFCCC, Bonn Climate Change Talks – August 2009, at
http://unfccc.int/meetings/intersessional/bonn_09_2/items/4913.php.
67 Sven Harmeling, Political Will at the Highest Level Needed: A Hesitant Beginning to the “Countdown to
Copenhagen” at the Climate Negotiations in Bonn, June 2009, (Germanwatch, June 2009) available at
http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/sb30rese.pdf.
68 Christopher Bals, Copenhagen: The Climate Train in the “Valley of Death”: Results of the UN Climate
Summit in Poland, 1-12 December, 2009 (Germanwatch Briefing Paper) (2009) at 4, available at
http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/c14rese.pdf.
69 David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, and International Law, 15
Hastings W. - N.W. J. Envt’l L. and Pol’y 39, 43 (2009).
70 Id. at 44.
71 Id.
72 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, available at
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml.
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survive the coming vicissitudes of nature and the coming economic and political upheavals . . . that
are now befalling and will continue to befall them.” 73 More specific to the concerns of global health
law, adaptation of human systems includes the building of capacity, including through law and policy
reform, to face the health impacts anticipated as a result of climate change.
Article 2 of the UNFCCC sets a goal of stabilizing atmospheric GHG emissions at such a
level as would “allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.” 74 As it has become increasingly clear that mitigating climate change – to the point where
natural adaptation is possible – is unlikely to be achieved, attention has shifted to planned adaptation
of human systems. The concept of planned adaptation of human systems to climate change has
always been a part of the UNFCCC. Article 4.4 of the UNFCCC requires that developed countries
“shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects
of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.” 75 Until relatively recently,
however, adaptation has taken a backseat to mitigation efforts.
Focus on adaptation has been somewhat controversial within the environmental advocacy
and climate science communities because some fear that it will reduce the impetus for mitigation
efforts by admitting that mitigation efforts are unlikely to reduce anthropogenic climate change at a
fast enough rate to prevent significant impacts, and by casting those impacts as manageable through
technological and social advances. 76 On the other hand, by “shift[ing] the question from whether
impacts from climate change will occur in the near term, and whether some portion will be
unacceptable, to the hows of achieving some control over the more dire consequences expected,” 77
the adaptation question has in some ways moved the climate community forward and has created
the opportunity for greater engagement of scientific, advocacy, and policy communities in other
fields, including agriculture and global health. Additionally, the focus on adaptation, by making the
discussion of climate change impacts more concrete, is also more amenable to the framing of
climate change as an environmental justice issue. Research on projected impacts, and on the likely
Takacs, supra note X, at 44.
UNFCCC, art. 2.
75 UNFCCC, art. 4.4.
76 See, e.g., Mark Hertsgaard, On the Front Lines of Climate Change, Time, Apr. 9, 2007, at 102, available at
http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/environment/article/0,28804,1602354_1596572_1604879,00.html; Rick
Salutin, Adaptation Equals Doing Nothing, Globe & Mail, Feb. 9, 2007, available at
http://www.rabble.ca/columnists/adaptation-equals-doing-nothing.
77 Kristie L. Ebi, Joel B. Smith and Ian Burton, eds. Integration of Public Health with Adaptation to Climate
Change: Lessons Learned and New Directions (2005), xviii.
73
74

Wiley, forthcoming Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation

15

vulnerability and adaptation capacity of various regions, highlights the fact that climate change is
largely driven by those in industrialized nations; meanwhile, its impacts will be felt first and foremost
by those in developing nations who also have the least capacity to adapt to those impacts. 78
In 2006, at the Nairobi Conference of Parties, member states negotiated the establishment of
the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund and the Nairobi Work Program on Adaptation. The Fund is
generated by a 2% tax levied on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, which are
emission offset projects undertaken by industrialized countries (primarily by way of private
enterprises) in the developing world. 79 This innovative funding mechanism has the potential to
create an adaptation budget that could be as much as five times the budgets of the two previously
created climate change funds, which relied on direct funding from donor countries. 80 The
Adaptation Fund is expected to generate between $80 and $300 million per year between now and
2012, when the Kyoto Protocol expires. 81 The Fund is dedicated to enabling concrete adaptation
activities, and experts are anticipating a frenzy of proposals seeking a piece of the pie.
The Adaptation Fund Board has indicated that that it wishes “to implement adaptation
activities promptly where sufficient information is available to warrant such activities, inter alia, in
the areas of water resources management, land management, agriculture, health, infrastructure
development, fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems, and integrated coastal zone
management.” 82 Because the United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it does not currently
have any direct means of influencing decisions with respect to the Adaptation Fund. Instead, the
European Union has taken on a leadership role. Significant progress was made in 2008 and 2009 on
readying the Adaptation Fund for implementation. The basic structure of the fund was established,
See Anthony Costello, et al., Managing the Health Effects of Climate Change, 373 The Lancet 1693, 1712 (2009).
The CDM has a somewhat controversial past. It grew out of a proposal by Brazil with the support of the G-77
nations for a means for compelling Annex 1 countries to meet their emissions reduction targets by requiring a fine for
emissions in excess of their targeted limits, funds from which would be used for mitigation and adaptation projects in
developing countries. Eventually, however, the program morphed into a mechanism for allowing industrialized
countries, and more specifically private actors within them, to avoid real emissions reduction while making a profit at the
same time. Private enterprises can use CDM projects in developing countries (primarily China, Brazil, Mexico and India,
which have the infrastructure to meet the bureaucratic and technical requirements imposed by the CDM) to offset
requirements imposed on them by their national governments. They can also profit by selling or trading credits in an
emissions trading regime. “Much, if not most of the U.N.-sponsored effort in the past ten years around climate change
has gone into making a functional CDM, much to the benefit of business interests around the world. Private actors
generated $US30 billion per year worth of CDM projects in 2006, the first year after the Kyoto Protocol went into
effect.” Takacs, supra note X, at 53-54.
80 Benito Müeller, The Nairobi Climate Change Conference: a Breakthrough for Adaptation Funding, Oxford Energy
and Environment Comment (January 2007), available at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0107-1.pdf.
81 Id.
82 Adaptation Fund Board, Draft Provisional Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from
the Adaptation Fund (August 2008), available at http://www.adaptationfund.org/images/AFB.B.3.8_Operational_Policies_and_Guidelines_08.26.08_-_revised.1.pdf.
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and the groundwork was laid for a large-scale finance architecture to be negotiated in Copenhagen. 83
Much to the chagrin of developing countries, however, industrialized countries expressed
considerable reluctance toward increasing the funding through a variety of mechanisms that have
been proposed. 84 Furthermore, the financing of the Adaptation Fund is linked to the potential
success of a post-2012 mitigation regime. 85 Developing countries expressed at the Bali COP in 2007
that their willingness to participate in the mitigation regime hinged on the scaling up of funding for
adaptation. 86
Although recent developments indicate significant progress on the development of an
adaptation regime under the UNFCCC, adaptation in the developing countries that are at greatest
risk of catastrophic climate impacts suffers from an implementation gap, 87 as funds have not been
provided and the infrastructure required to make use of adaptation funding is not in place in the
poorest countries. 88 One of the great ironies of climate change adaptation is that countries that are
likely to see the least severe impacts from climate change have spent monumentally more on
adaptation within their borders than they have donated to adaptation in the poorest countries, where
far more significant impacts will be felt. While developed nations are currently spending about $40
million per year to fund adaptation in developing countries, they are spending about $40 billion per
year on their own adaptation projects. 89

See Sven Harmeling and Alpha Kaloga, Adaptation Fund: Critical Progress at the 7th Meeting (Germanwatch Briefing
Paper (September 2009), available at http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/afb2009-09r.pdf.
84 Sven Harmeling, Adaptation Under the UNFCCC – The Road from Bonn to Poznan 2008 (Germanwatch Briefing
Paper) (August 2008), available at http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/bonnadapt08e.pdf at 6.
85 See Eric Lyman, Kyoto: Power Shift in the Making, ISN Security Watch (June 19, 2009) available at
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=102025.
86 Bals, supra note X, at 4.
87 Id.
88 80% of CDM projects, which develop mitigation and adaptation capacity in the developing world, are in Brazil, China,
Mexico, and India, where infrastructure is advanced enough to meet the bureaucratic and technical requirements
imposed by the CDM. Takacs, supra note X, a Y.
89 Id. at 56, citing Andrew C. Revkin, Poor Nations to Bear Brunt as World Warms, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2007, available
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IV
THE ROLE OF HEALTH ADVOCACY IN THE NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A POST2012 FRAMEWORK
A. Putting a Human Face on Climate Change
Policymakers, advocates, and scholars alike have noted that putting a human face on climate
change could be the key to motivating the massive political will that will be required to effectively
respond to climate change. Roberto Bertolini of the World Health Organization says that he hopes
that climate change will bring to mind the image of a malnourished child in Africa dying of diarrheal
illness rather than the image of a drowning polar bear. 90 Lisa Heinzerling, a legal scholar who was
recently named Senior Climate Counselor to the Administrator of Environmental Protection
Agency, has argued that the characterization of climate change as “knowing killing” of people in the
developing world creates a moral obligation on the part of industrialized countries to respond. 91 But
beyond these broad strokes and general references to the connection between climate change and
global health, what are the concrete opportunities for health advocates to influence the international
response to this emerging threat? As a good starting point, putting a human face on climate change
has an important role to play in reaching an agreement on the limit beyond which the extent of
climate change becomes unacceptable.
As discussed above, the objective of the UNFCCC is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.” 92 What that level is and what the timeframe should be is still a
matter of debate. The goal that has gained consensus in negotiations leading up to Copenhagen (but
agreement upon which was still far from certain) is a limit to global warming of 2˚C. In the months
leading up to Copenhagen, a growing number of parties began calling for an even stricter limit of
1.5˚C, based on concerns that the impacts even at a 2˚C increase are unacceptable. 93 The European
Union, Norway, Iceland, African Nations, and Chile joined the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS) in campaigning for this stricter limit, and other developing countries indicated that they

Conversation with the author, January 21, 2009.
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may join the effort as well. 94 IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri stated that the two-degree limit
may not be ambitious enough, and activist Al Gore publically called for a 1.5˚C limit. 95
Even to limit global warming to an increase of 2˚C, the IPCC has recommended that GHG
emissions must be reduced by 25%-40% of 1990 levels by 2020. 96 By way of comparison, the
Obama administration has recently indicated a willingness to cut emissions to 1990 levels (the so
called “zero percent target”) by 2020. 97 The Kyoto Protocol commits 37 industrialized countries
and the European Union to reducing emissions to 5% below 1990 levels by 2012, and parties have
failed to meet even those modest targets. 98 The European Union recently indicated willingness to
commit to a 30% reduction below 1990 levels by 2020, contingent upon an agreement by other
nations to do the same. 99 Although this was the most ambitious target announced by any
industrialized country, experts believe that even a reduction of this scale may not be sufficient to
limit global warming to under 2˚C. 100
The campaign for consideration of a 1.5˚C pathway has been driven in large part by
arguments regarding sovereignty and the claim that no nation’s survival is negotiable. 101 In addition
to considering whether some small island states would cease to exist altogether under the 2˚C
scenario, however, policymakers should highlight the considerable difference in impacts, particularly
health impacts, that might be seen between the two paths, and between the 2˚C pathway and an
even higher degree of change. The 2˚C limit appears to be the point at which sea level rise would be
severe enough that millions more people experience coastal flooding, 102 though, increasingly,
scientists believe that point may be reached at the 1.5˚C point. Most of the health impacts described
above begin at the 0.5˚C point, however, and some of them are already in evidence today. Localized
impacts on food security are currently in evidence, but experts believe that decreases in crop yields
will become widespread by the 1˚C point, and will reach critical levels by 3.5˚C.103 Water stress is
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97 See John Heilprin, Obama on Climate Change: US ‘Determined to Act’(September 22, 2009), available at
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98 See ISN Current Affairs, Call for Agreement to Replace Kyoto (September 1, 2009), available at
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increased at an extremely low threshold and worsens rapidly with increasing average temperatures. 104
More research is needed to assess the relationship between the severity of health impacts and
increasing average temperatures, but the argument here is that emphasis on health impacts likely to
be felt by a large portion of the world’s population may be more persuasive than primarily pointing
toward individual nations with relatively small populations that will be utterly devastated.
B. Sectoral Approaches to Mitigation with Co-Benefits for Health
In addition to providing a more compelling justification for climate change mitigation, health
concerns might shape the contours of the mitigation regime at the international level as well as
national-level implementation of international obligations. Health advocates should pay particular
attention to the incorporation of land use regulation into climate change mitigation strategies.
Worldwide, poor land use management, particularly deforestation, accounts for a greater share of
GHG emissions than either the transportation or industrial sectors – more than 20% of total
emissions. 105 Creation and maintenance of biological sinks for carbon is a difficult area to regulate
due to monitoring and measurement challenges, but it has important co-benefits for health, as well
as for biodiversity and support of sustainable livelihoods. 106 Reforestation and avoided deforestation
have gained ground in UNFCCC negotiations and may play a significant role in the post-2012
mitigation regime, primarily through the Clean Development Mechanism. 107 Promotion of
sustainable agricultural practices to reduce emissions and increase sinks has not played a major role
in international climate governance, but could still be an important part of national-level strategies to
meet targets imposed by Kyoto and its successor. Of course, the incorporation of land use, forestbased, and agricultural mitigation approaches into the post-Kyoto regime should be undertaken in
such a way that it will supplement, rather than supplant, emissions reductions from more traditional
sources in the industrialized world. Transport, 108 industrial, 109 and energy 110 sector emissions also
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See D. Schoene & M. Netto, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, The Kyoto Protocol: What
Does it Mean for Forests and Forestry? (2005), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0413e/a0413E02.htm.
106 Mohammed T. El-Ashry, An Overview of this Issue: Framework for a Post-Kyoto Climate Agreement, 8
Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 2, 3 (2008).
107 Takacs, supra note X at 57-58 (noting that current Kyoto Protocol rules allow only one percent of carbon credits
under the CDM to be allotted for projects in Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) and that avoided
deforestation projects are currently excluded from CDM eligibility, but it is expected they will be a part of the successor
to the Kyoto Protocol).
108 The transportation sector’s current reliance on fossil fuels plays a major role in ground-level ozone and particulate
matter air pollution with its resulting impacts on cardiovascular and respiratory health. A shift to greater use of public
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have more direct, local impacts on health in addition to their impact through climate change. Most
experts agree, moreover, that mitigation from all sectors and in both industrialized and developing
nations will be necessary to hold the extent and rate of climate change within boundaries that allow
for successful adaptation. 111
Proponents of forest-based mitigation approaches see reforestation (whereby “a project
developer plants trees to reforest a degraded ecosystem” 112) and avoided deforestation (whereby a
project developer “ensures that a forest that would have otherwise been degraded or felled is,
instead, preserved” 113) as opportunities to mitigate climate change by reducing emissions and
increasing sinks, while at the same time building ecological and social resilience to face the impacts
of climate change. Forests perform a wide range of ecological services that will be in ever greater
demand in the face of global climate change: stabilization of local climate fluctuations, drought
prevention, aquifer protection, preservation of pollinator populations, soil stabilization, and
buffering from storms and floods. 114 Deforestation has a major impact on the health of local
populations in addition to its indirect impact on global health through climate change. 115
Some have expressed concerns, however, that Forest Carbon Offset (FCO) projects, if not
carefully governed, could be manipulated to allow private industry to profit from projects that it
would have undertaken anyway, even in the absence of a carbon trading mechanism that takes them
into account, by using the extra carbon credits generated to allow emissions from industrialized
nations to continue unabated. 116 Incorporation of FCO projects into the Kyoto Protocol was
intentionally circumscribed based on concerns that experts have classified into four main categories:
Climate Change is a Public Health Issue (2008), available at
http://www.nphw.org/nphw08/NPHW%202008%20Blueprint.pdf.
109 Industrial emissions of carbon dioxide as well as other GHGs has impacts on air, soil and water pollution with
resulting impacts on health. See section X, infra.
110 The energy sector’s current reliance on coal-fired plants has significant impacts on air pollution, as well as soil and
water pollution, with resulting health impacts. See, e.g., Federica Perera, et al., Benefits of Reducing Exposure to CoalBurning Pollutants to Children’s Neurodevelopment in China, 116 Envt’l Health Perspectives 1396 (2008).
111 IPPC, Working Group III, supra note X at 9.
112 Takacs, supra note X, at 56.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 57, citing UNEP, World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Reducing Emissions From Deforestation: a Key
Opportunity for Attaining Multiple Benefits (Feb. 23, 2007), at 9-10, available at http://www.unepwcmc.org/resources/publications/unep_wcmc%20RED%20Feb07.pdf; Stefano Pagiola, Natasha Landell-Mills, &
Joshua Bishop, Making Market-based Mechanisms Work for Forests and People, in Stefano Pagiola, Joshua BishopP, &
Natasha Landell-Mills, Selling Forest Environmental Services: Market-Based Mechanisms for Conservation and
Development 224 (London, 2002). Certified Emission Reductions Sale and Purchase Agreement (CERSPA), Guidance
Document Version 1.0, Apr. 2007, www.cerspa.org; David Freestone, Foreword in Charlotte Streck, et al., eds, Climate
Change and Forests: Emerging Policy and Market Opportunities (London, 2008).
115 See, e.g., Y.A. Afrane, et al., Deforestation and Vectorial Capacity of Anopheles gambiae Giles Mosquitoes in Malaria
Transmission, Kenya. 14 Emerg Infect Dis. 1533 (2008).
116 See Takacs, supra note x, at 58-59.
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leakage, permanence, additionality, and quantifiability. 117 “Leakage” refers to the concern that
stakeholders who formerly relied on felling trees in a forest that becomes protected will simply move
their operations elsewhere. “[A] government may preserve one forest from planned logging and
instead offer timber concessions elsewhere; logging companies denied concession rights in one
country may instead cut timber in a neighboring country.” 118 “Permanence” refers to the concern
that carbon sinks may be destroyed in the future as forests burn or are eventually encroached upon
by other land uses, resulting in an eventual increase in emissions that offsets the temporary sink. 119
“Additionality” refers to the concern that some FCO projects would have been undertaken even in
the absence of a carbon credit, based purely on profit motive. The result is a net increase in
emissions as carbon credits awarded to projects that would have been undertaken anyway are used
to avoid emission reductions in other sectors. 120 Finally, “quantifiability” refers to problems of
measurement, monitoring, reporting, and verification associated with “calculating present and future
carbon stored in forests, particularly under different climate change scenarios,” 121 as well as the
difficulties of regulating a system that is more irregular in terms of its inputs and outputs than the
transportation, energy, and industry sectors. This is obviously an area where there is a significant
threat that potential benefits may not be realized if the regulatory mechanism does not adequately
take these special considerations into account. Given that this is a hotly contested issue among the
environmental policy community, health policymakers have an opportunity to highlight the cobenefits for health of reforestation, and especially avoided deforestation, as a consideration that

117 See Imke Sagemüller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for Biodiversity, 31 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 189, 192 (2006).
118 Takacs, supra note x, at 58, citing Patricia Nelson, An African Dimension to the Clean Development Mechanism:
Finding a Path to Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector, 32 Denv. J. Int'l L & Pol'y 615, 645 (2004); Johannes
Ebeling, Risks and Criticisms of Forestry-Based Climate Change Mitigation and Carbon Trading, in Streck, et al, supra
note X., at 50-51; Philippe Cullet & Annie Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Activities Implemented Jointly in the Forestry Sector:
Conceptual and Operational Fallacies, 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev., 98, 111 (1997); World Bank Carbon Finance Unit,
Forest Concept Partnership Facility, Concept Note 4 (2007), available at http://carbonfinance.org/docs/FCPF_
Concept_Note_FINAL.pdf; Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through
Emissions Trading 17 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 267, 291, 296 (2004).
119 See id., citing Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law 124 (2007); Sagemüller,
supra note X, at 195; UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, supra note X, at 4-5; Ebeling, supra note X, at 47.
120 See id., citing Revkin, supra note X; Marisa Meizlish & David Brand, Developing Forestry Carbon Projects for the
Voluntary Carbon Market: A Practical Analysis in Streck et al., eds., supra note X, at 317; Larry Lohmann, Carbon
Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatization and Power, Dag Hammarskjold Centre Development
Dialogue No. 48, Sept. 2006, at 227, 238, 240, 267, 306, http://
www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/DD2006_48_carbon_trading/carbon_trading_web_HQ.pdf at 145; Sebastian M. Scholz &
Martina Jung, Forestry Projects under the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation: Rules and
Regulations in Streck et al., eds., supra note X, at 76-77.
121 Id., citing Walsh, supra note X; Baumert, supra note X, at 396; Cullet & Kameri-Mbote, supra note X, at 99.
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might tip the scale in favor of investing the considerable resources that will be required to regulate
this area adequately if it is to be included in the mitigation regime.
Agricultural practices also play an important role in determining GHG emissions and carbon
sinks. Agriculture accounts for roughly 14% of global GHG emissions. 122 The link to deforestation,
much of which is prompted by agricultural expansion, is also important for global emissions. 123
Production and use of nitrogen-based fertilizers, use of fossil fuels for agricultural production,
animal waste management, and livestock enteric fermentation are all important sources of GHG
emissions, which can be reduced by improvements in management practices. 124 At the same time,
sustainable agricultural practices such as conservation tillage, cover cropping, and crop rotation
practices can increase carbon sinks. 125 The IPCC has estimated that there is potential for mitigation
in the agricultural sector of the equivalent of 5.0-5.6 gigatons of carbon dioxide per year by 2030. 126
For reference, total global emissions in 2000 were equivalent to 43 gigatons of carbon dioxide. 127
The vast majority of this potential is in soil carbon sequestration – the use of sustainable agricultural
practices such as conservation tillage, cover cropping, and crop rotation to increase carbon sinks by
increasing the amount of carbon sequestered in soil. 128 Reduction in methane emissions through
improved management of livestock and rice farming practices, as well as reduction in nitrogen
emissions through cropland management practices, round out the remaining potential for
mitigation. 129
The huge potential for agricultural mitigation is made even more attractive by the fact that it
is a relatively low-cost approach. Many abatement options are cost-neutral or even net-profitpositive and require relatively low capital investment, in part because the required technology is
already well-developed. 130 If agriculture industry players are allowed to trade the carbon credits they
generate through low-cost interventions with players in other industries where mitigation is more
IPCC, supra note X, at Y.
FAO, Enabling Agriculture to Contribute to Climate Change Mitigation (2008) available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/smsn/igo/036.pdf.
124 See id. at 3; see also Gowri Koneswaran and Danielle Nierenberg, Global Farm Animal Production and Global
Warming: Impacting and Mitigating Climate Change, 116 Env’tl Health Perspectives 578 (2008).
125 Id.
126 IPCC, supra note X, at Y.
127 IPCC, Working Group III, supra note X, at 9.
128 The same practices that improve soil quality with decreased use of fertilizers can also increase the amount of carbon
sequestered in soil. See Perry Miller, Rick Engel, and Ross Bricklemyer, Soil Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture: Farm
Management Practices Can Affect Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Montguide (April 2004), available at
http://msuextension.org/publications/AgandNaturalResources/MT200404AG.pdf.
129 FAO, supra note X, at 1.
130 Id. at 2, citing IPCC (2007) and McKinsey (2009).
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costly, then the result will actually be profit for the agriculture industry. Thus, the incorporation of
the agricultural sector into a GHG trading mechanism has the potential to subsidize, rather than
impede, sustainable agricultural development, which in turn has significant benefits not only for
climate change adaptation, but for meeting routine needs in the short-term as well. Seventy-five
percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas in developing countries, and agriculture is the primary
sector of the economy in most developing countries. 131 In addition to contributing to food security,
sustainable agricultural development can promote poverty reduction in surrounding communities
while preserving the resilience of agro-ecosystems. 132
Despite these potential benefits, however, agricultural mitigation is even less far along in its
incorporation into international climate governance than forest-based mitigation. Agriculture-based
carbon sinks through soil carbon sequestration are not currently eligible for CDM project status,
with a very narrow research-based exception, 133 and the CDM itself makes up a relatively small part
of the mitigation regime. Agricultural sequestration poses the same difficulties of permanence,
leakage, additionality, and quantifiability 134 that the forestry/land use sector presents. The
technology for measuring soil carbon sequestration is perhaps farther along than policymakers
realize, however, according to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 135 Furthermore,
FAO notes that leakage is less likely to be a concern in the agricultural sector than in the forestry
sector in light of the likelihood that incorporation of agricultural mitigation operations is likely to be
maintained and even expand, rather than decrease, agricultural production. 136 Permanence, on the
other hand, may be a greater concern in the agricultural sector than in forestry given that sustainable
agricultural practices would need to be continued year after year to preserve the sequestration of
carbon in soil and biomass. 137
The greatest barrier to enabling agricultural mitigation approaches is not technology or cost
to the agricultural sector, but rather the lack of financial and regulatory mechanisms that can
accommodate the attributes that set the agricultural sector apart from other regulated sectors like
transportation, energy, and industry. In addition to the concerns discussed above, the agricultural
sector is also a difficult area for climate change mitigation “due to the sheer size of land areas under
Id.
Id.
133 Id.
134 See pp x-x, infra.
135 FAO, supra note X, at 3.
136 Id.
137 Id.
131
132
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agriculture around the world (but at the same time this breadth of opportunity, which exceeds that
of forestry, is part of its potential)[,] the variation in agroecosystems and farming systems, as well as
the large numbers of farmers that would need to be involved.” 138 Unlike the forestry/land use
sector, incorporating agricultural sector mitigation opportunities into the international framework is
far more complicated than simply scaling up the CDM. “Not only are many sources of agricultural
mitigation not allowed under CDM, but its project-based and offsets approach does not generate the
breadth and scale of incentives that are needed.” 139 Whereas mitigation in the forestry sector
requires only that investors preserve forests or reforest degraded land, “[c]apturing the full potential
of agricultural mitigation and its co-benefits requires widespread changes in agricultural production
systems, which in turn requires changes in policy, institutions, and technologies and a much broader
approach by mitigation financing mechanisms.” 140 In particular, innovative policy and financing
solutions must provide equal opportunities for both small-scale land holders as well as large-scale
land owners; provide equal opportunities for rights to emissions; allow for effective incentivizing
and enjoyment of co-benefits; allow tradable rights to emissions reductions to be held by land users,
based on traditional as well as formal systems of property rights; make options for emissions
crediting and trading flexible enough to allow for the diversity of mitigation approaches that might
be appropriate in a particular local context; and ensure that expanded agricultural development that
takes advantage of emissions trading opportunities is in conformance with international law for the
protection of biodiversity. 141
Perhaps the most important policy decision that would allow land use management and
agricultural practices to play a major role in climate change mitigation with co-benefits for health is
to what extent and in what ways developing countries are included in the post-Kyoto mitigation
regime. This is indeed a key debate for determining the future of the successor mitigation regime,
and was in many ways crucial to the downfall of the Kyoto Protocol. Much of the debate has
focused on the reluctance of fully industrialized countries like the United States 142 and those in the
European Union143 to commit to binding targets unless the rapidly industrializing nations like China
and India that are emerging as important competitors are also bound. But there is another
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 6.
142 See Byrd-Hagel Resolution, supra note X.
143 Although the E.U. did in fact ratify the Kyoto Protocol, it has not met its targets under that agreement. More
recently, the E.U. has indicated a willingness to commit to a X reduction by Y, but only if other major competitors do
the same. See Bals, supra note X.
138
139
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consideration in favor of incorporating developing countries, especially those that are rapidly
industrializing, into the successor mitigation regime. The great majority of land use emissions are in
the developing world, and 70% of the huge potential for mitigation in the agricultural sector (most
of which is based on increasing sinks) is in the developing world. 144 While forest and agricultural
emissions and sink reductions account for a larger share of GHG concentrations than transportation
and industrial sectors when considered globally, in industrialized countries they are far less
significant. Although some global health advocates, based on the premise that economic
development is a critical determinant of health, 145 may fear that emissions limits will hinder
development in the poorer countries of the world, and thus be harmful to global heatlh, 146 it is
important to understand that the mitigation strategies that will be particularly crucial at the national
level if developing counties are included will have significant co-benefits for the health of local
populations. A massive expansion of the CDM might allow for better exploitation of mitigation
opportunities in the developing world without binding developing countries to their own emissions
reduction targets, though it would not necessarily be enough to induce industrialized countries to
participate in a protocol that does not bind their rapidly industrializing competitors.
C. The Importance of Public Health Infrastructure to Adaptation
Human civilization has always adapted to gradual climate change via accommodation or
migration, but what is unprecedented is the rapidity with which we must now adapt to climate
change that is greatly accelerated by anthropogenic forcing. 147 What is new is “the conscious,
planned, anticipatory approach” that has been proposed by the climate science and advocacy
community. 148 One of the greatest challenges to adaptation planning is that while there is nearly
universal scientific consensus about the fact that anthropogenically forced climate change is
occurring, and that it will have significant impacts, the rate and degree of change and the severity of
impacts is still subject to a great deal of uncertainty, particularly at the local level. The attempt to
premeditate adaptation strategies, and thus enhance our preparedness for the impacts of climate
change, touches on technological and policy advances addressing everything from retreat of physical
FAO, supra note X, at 1.
See, e.g., Lant Pritchett and Lawrence H. Summers, Wealthier is Healthier, 31 Journal of Human Resources 841-868
(1996).
146 See, e.g., Commission on Social Determinants of Health, Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through
Action on the Social Determinants of Health, Final Report of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health, World
Health Organization (2008).
147 Kristie L. Ebi, Joel B. Smith and Ian Burton, eds. Integration of Public Health with Adaptation to Climate
Change: Lessons Learned and New Directions (2005), xvii.
148 Id.
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infrastructure projects away from coastlines and building of structures to withstand more extreme
weather events to developing agricultural technologies that can sustain food production in the face
of harsher environmental conditions. In the health sector, adaptation to climate change is expected
to require a variety of changes to health systems. Both health-care delivery systems and public
health infrastructure will come into play. Adaptation to climate change is anticipated to require
increased capacity to provide access to adequate and affordable health care as well as capacity for
early warning systems, disease monitoring and surveillance, natural disaster and public health
emergency preparedness and response, and public education interventions. 149 Additionally,
provision for basic survival needs – especially water and food systems management – will be crucial
to our capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change. Particularly in the developing world,
public health infrastructure and national health law have a long way to go to rise to the challenges
that climate change is likely to pose.
In addition to creating novel threats to health and shifting the geographic scope of existing
threats, climate change will also act as an intensifier, dramatically increasing the magnitude of
preexisting problems ranging from poverty, conflict, and hunger to infectious and chronic disease
burdens. Some health adaptation measures will be aimed at confronting new risks posed by climate
change, at least at the local level, such as preparation for monitoring and control of malaria-carrying
mosquitoes at higher altitudes where populations have not previously been exposed, or response to
new diseases that might emerge in the context of changed environmental conditions. Most
adaptations in the context of global health, however, are likely to be “no-regrets strategies.” 150
Improvements of public health systems focusing on accessible basic health care facilities, clean water
and sanitation, and disease control programs may be motivated in part by climate change concerns,
but are likely to have significant benefits regardless of whether climate in fact has the impact that
scientists anticipate. These strategies have the potential to enhance the ability of public health
systems to respond to the routine threats they already face, even as those threats intensify.
The public health and global health communities have a long history of managing new
threats to population well-being. In many ways, the health advocacy community is more
experienced with the type of questions presented by climate change adaptation than is the
environmental advocacy community. Whereas international environmental governance has typically
been concerned with regimes that limit the actions of state (and consequently industrial) players,
149
150

See generally id.
Id. at xviii.
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global health governance has been more focused on promotion of health and well-being through
affirmative duties. Adaptation necessarily builds more on the latter sort of inquiry and thus is in
some ways far afield of the typical focus on environmental regulatory bodies. Health advocates
bring their experience in evaluating the success and investigating the failure of various types of
intervention as well as what they have learned through their experiments with a variety of positive
law and policy tools.
Although health advocates have been regrettably late to the climate governance table, global
health voices are increasingly speaking to climate change as among the most important threats to
worldwide human well-being. In a recent resolution, the World Health Assembly committed to
providing member states with support and advice regarding health impacts of climate change and
adaptation approaches independently of the UNFCCC, and also to seeking a greater role within the
UNFCCC. 151 The UNFCCC Secretariat has been criticized for not adequately “supporting
processes outside the Convention which have particular expertise in areas that are key to
adaptation.” 152 One issue among many under consideration by the UNFCCC Ad-hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP)
is whether a permanent adaptation body or expert group should be established under the
UNFCCC. 153 An adaptation body or panel would create a procedural opportunity for health
experts, among others, to play a more active role in climate adaptation governance.
Another issue under debate in the UNFCCC AWG-LCA that has implications for global
health policy is whether adaptation assistance from wealthy to developing countries should be
“mainstreamed” with Official Development Assistance (ODA). Developed nations have
increasingly called for the integration of adaptation into general development policy and planning as
a precondition for funding. 154 Integration of policy is not particularly controversial and most agree
that it is in fact crucial to the development of coherent adaptation strategies at the national level.
“Adaptation is not simply a matter of designing projects or putting together lists of measures to
reduce the impacts of climate change. A national policy response would increase resilience to

WHA 61.19 (May 24, 2008).
Harmeling, supra note X, at 42.
153 Id. at 42-44. Developing countries largely support the establishment of an adaptation body, urging that it would
allow for better integration of expertise specific to the varied areas touched on by adaptation policy. Several
industrialized countries have expressed opposition to the idea, noting that there are ways to make use of existing bodies
outside of the UNFCCC rather than taking on the expense of creating a new adaptation body.
154 Id. at 21-22.
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climate vulnerability and change and should be anchored in a country’s framework for economic
growth and sustainable development and integrated in its poverty reduction strategies.” 155
The controversy arises because developing nations have perceived this call for
mainstreaming as an indication that developed countries will shirk their responsibility for
compensating developing countries for the impacts of anthropogenically forced climate change.
The majority of developed countries have indeed argued that “[b]ecause the costs of adaptation . . .
provide largely local benefits, were difficult to distinguish from ‘regular’ development, were
suspected to be large, and smacked of compensation awarded for damages,” 156 substantial funding
should not be allocated for adaptation, and have instead suggested that Official Development
Assistance will play an important role in financing adaptation measures. Given that most countries
already fall far short of meeting their ODA commitments, 157 developing countries insist that
“adaptation is not funded as general Official Development Assistance (ODA), but as a kind of
compensation for extra costs that are imposed on them by those who [] contribute the most to
greenhouse gas emissions. 158
The debate highlights that what may seem on the surface to be a win-win or “no regrets”
situation, where funds invested for climate change adaptation also have multiple co-benefits and are
thus more cost-effective, may belie an attempt to shift funds from ODA to climate change
adaptation without actually increasing assistance overall. Fundamental principles of international
environmental law support adaptation-only funding as opposed to ODA mainstreaming. Both the
“polluter pays” principle established in the Rio Declaration 159 and the “common but differentiated
responsibility” principle, which forms the legal foundation of the UNFCCC, 160 support exactly the
compensatory character of adaptation funding to which developed countries have objected.
El-Ashry, supra note X, at 5.
Id. at 6.
157 See Anthony Clunies-Ross, Development Finance: Beyond “Official Development Assistance,” 26 Mich. J. Int’l L.
389 (2004).
158 Harmeling, supra note X, at 22.
159 UNEP, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, (June 3-14, 1992), available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?
DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 (“National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in
principle, bear the costs of pollution.”) See also Cass Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 54 (2007) (describing GHG pollution as a kind of tort, where polluters who have gained
economically from their pollution ought to pay for the damage they have caused).
160 UNFCCC, art. 3 (“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and
the adverse effects thereof.”).
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Furthermore, given that ODA already falls far short of what is needed in the developing world, the
innovative financing structure of the Adaptation Fund is a promising development. 161 Global health
advocates should promote the integration of climate adaptation considerations into development
plans, but should also advocate strongly for building upon the Adaptation Fund’s financing
mechanism to allow for significantly higher funding, rather than mainstreaming of adaptation
funding into ODA.
“Public health prevention and climate change adaptation share the goal of increasing the
ability of nations, communities, and individuals to effectively and efficiently cope with challenges
and changes. Indeed, that is what is meant by adaptation to an external stress.” 162 Emphasis on
climate change as a fundamental transformation of our environment that will have important
consequences for human health has the potential to motivate the additional political will needed to
improve our global health infrastructure in ways that will better position us to handle routine needs
as those everyday needs intensify. Many potential climate change adaptation projects – such as the
development of better disease surveillance and response capacity, improvements in sanitation and
protection of food and water security, and the strengthening of natural disaster preparedness and
response capabilities, look a lot like traditional international health initiatives.
Rights and responsibilities with respect to adaptation currently being negotiated under the
auspices of the UNFCCC have the potential to create new opportunities to focus on the basic
survival needs of the world’s least healthy people 163 in ways that previous efforts at international
cooperation with respect to health have not. This is due to a basic difference between the
motivation for traditional means of international cooperation with respect to health and the
motivation driving cooperation on adaptation. The recently revised International Health
Regulations, for example, establish obligations for international cooperation that are largely driven
by the threat of transboundary spread of disease, 164 and some critics have suggested that the history
of these regulations indicates that they are ultimately motivated by the threat of spread from the

161 Cf. Clunies-Ross, supra note X (financing approaches that go beyond official development assistance, including
internationally coordinated levies, are necessary to provide sufficient funding for development).
162 Gary Yohe and Kristie L. Ebi, Approaching Adaptation: Parallels and Contrasts Between the Climate and Health
Communities, in Integration of Public Health with Adaptation to Climate Change: Lessons Learned and New
Directions (2005), Kristie L. Ebi, Joel B. Smith and Ian Burton, eds., at 18.
163 Cf., Sven Harmeling, et al., Making the Adaptation Fund Work for the Most Vulnerable People, Germanwatch
Discussion Paper (December 2008) available at http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/adfund08.pdf.
164 See David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The New International
Health Regulations, 4 Chinese J. Int’l L.325 (2005).
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developing world to the industrialized world. 165 Focus on self-interest as a motivation for wealthy
countries’ willingness to cooperate on global health initiatives necessarily plays a role in dictating the
priorities that will be addressed by that cooperation. This emphasis leads, for example, to
prioritization of emerging diseases that have the potential for rapid spread over reducing more
burdensome impacts from relatively easily addressed threats such as parasitic or diarrheal illness. 166
The health impacts of climate change are, for the most part, not the sort of threats that are likely to
move rapidly from the developing world to the industrialized world. It is certainly possible that
changed climate conditions could foster the emergence of new viruses with the potential for global
spread. It is more likely, however, that most threats – the intensification of diarrheal illness, the
gradual latitudinal and altitudinal spread of vector-borne illness, greater intensity of natural disasters,
and the effects of insecurity and water stress more generally – will not be of the sort that prompt
self-interested action by wealthy countries to build improved health infrastructure in the developing
world. The adaptation regime currently under negotiation, however, is not prompted by the
transboundary nature of the impacts of climate change as much as it is by the transboundary nature
of the causes. This might mean that adaptation cooperation faces an uphill battle, but if it is
successful – and the tie between adaptation cooperation for the benefit of developing countries and
the willingness of developing countries to participate in a mitigation regime might be the crucial key
to that success – then it will allow for international cooperation on health threats that have
previously been neglected.
IV
CONCLUSION
As the focus of the UNFCCC has broadened to include greater consideration of adaptation
to the impacts of climate change, communities beyond the traditional boundaries of environmental
regulatory policymaking have begun to realize the extent to which their interests are implicated by
the international response to climate change. Indeed, adaptation requires a very different set of law,
policy, and governance tools than environmental policymakers have traditionally employed in their
See id.; see also Oyewale Tomori, IHR and Movement of Pathogens in a Globalized World, presentation prepared for
the Forum on Microbial Threats Public Workshop (addressing perception of the motivation behind the IHR as an
obstacle to implementation in developing countries).
166 See, e.g., Peter J. Hotez, et al, Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, 357 New Engl. J. Med. 118 (2007)
(comparing the impacts of neglected tropical diseases, most of which are preventable through environmental health
interventions such as clean water and sanitation, with those of emerging acute infections such as Ebola virus and avian
influenza).
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mitigation efforts, 167 and it may be that policymakers from other sectors, including global health, are
better suited to the effort. In recent years, the UNFCCC has shown a greater willingness to reach
out to these communities – including the health, agricultural, and land use sectors – for expertise
and policymaking guidance on mitigation policy as well as adaptation. The challenges posed by such
an all-encompassing scope for international cooperation are indeed considerable, but so are the
opportunities. Consideration of the co-benefits of particular mitigation opportunities, for health as
well as for sustainable development more generally, should play a crucial role in weighing the various
policy options currently under consideration. By prompting a recalculation of the costs and
benefits, bringing these broader considerations into account may serve to move the debate forward
in a way that increases the likelihood that the international community will take meaningful action
on climate change as the 2009 agreement is implemented and in coming decades.

167 Cf Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood, Environmental Law for Sustainability, in Environmental Law for
Sustainability 1, 2 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., Hart Publishing 2006) (discussing the “command and
control” approach traditionally applied to environmental problems).
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